Measuring Systemic Risk of

Banking in Indonesia by MUHARAM, Harjum
10/25/2018 Turnitin
file:///C:/Users/TOSHIBA/Documents/Jurnal%20untuk%20LK/Hasil%20uji%20turnitin/Turnitin_Originality_Report_1025035412.html 1/11
Turnitin Originality
Report
Processed on: 23-Oct-2018 10:36 WIB
ID: 1025035412
Word Count: 6309
Submitted: 1
Measuring Systemic Risk of
Banking in Indonesia By
Harjum Muharam
 
Similarity Index
11%
Internet Sources: 7%
Publications: 7%
Student Papers: N/A
Similarity by Source
3% match (Internet from 30-Aug-2018)
https://doaj.org/article/4ead851760d940aba6fb0bd5ca8b6e02
2% match (Internet from 30-Apr-2016)
http://eprints.undip.ac.id/48660/1/04_ERWIN.pdf
2% match (Internet from 17-Mar-2014)
http://www.bis.org/publ/gten05.pdf
2% match (publications)
Magazzino, Cosimo. "The relationship between revenue and expenditure in the
ASEAN countries.(Association of Southeast Asian Nations )", East Asia: An
International Quarterly
1% match (publications)
Sri Ayomi, Bambang Hermanto. "SYSTEMIC RISK AND FINANCIAL LINKAGES
MEASUREMENT IN THE INDONESIAN BANKING", Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan
Perbankan, 2014
1% match (publications)
Adrian, Tobias, and Markus K. Brunnermeier. "CoVaR†", American Economic Review,
2016.
1% match (Internet from 12-May-2010)
http://www.bis.org/publ/work296.pdf?noframes=1
Signifikan: Jurnal Ilmu Ekonomi Volume 6 (2), October 2017 P-ISSN: 2087-
2046; E-ISSN: 2476-9223 Page 301– 318 Measuring Systemic Risk of
Banking in Indonesia: Conditional Value at Risk Model Application Harjum
Muharam1, Erwin2 Universitas Diponegoro 1hardjum@gmail.com,
2erwin0615@yahoo.co.id Abstract Systemic risk is a risk of collapse of the
financial system that would cause the financial system is not functioning
properly. Measurement of systemic risk in the financial institutions, especially
10/25/2018 Turnitin
file:///C:/Users/TOSHIBA/Documents/Jurnal%20untuk%20LK/Hasil%20uji%20turnitin/Turnitin_Originality_Report_1025035412.html 2/11
banks are crucial, because banks are highly vulnerable to financial crisis. In
this study, to estimate the conditional value-at-risk (CoVaR) used quantile
regression. Samples in this study of 9 banks have total assets of the largest
in Indonesia. Testing the correlation between VaR and ΔCoVaR in this study
using Spearman correlation and Kendall's Tau. There are five banks that have
a significant correlation between VaR and ΔCoVaR, meanwhile four others
banks in the sample did not have a significant correlation. However, the
correlation coefficient is below 0.50, which indicates that there is a weak
correlation between VaR and CoVaR. Keywords: systemic risk, conditional
value at risk, value at risk, banking industry Abstrak Risiko sistemik adalah 
risiko jatuhnya sistem keuangan yang akan menyebabkan sistem keuangan
tidak berfungsi dengan baik. Pengukuran risiko sistemik di lembaga
keuangan terutama bank sangat penting, karena bank sangat rentan
terhadap krisis keuangan. Dalam penelitian ini, untuk memperkirakan nilai
kondisional-risiko (CoVaR) menggunakan regresi quantile. Sampel dalam
penelitian terhadap 9 bank ini memiliki total aset terbesar di Indonesia.
Menguji korelasi antara VaR dan ΔCoVaR dalam penelitian ini dengan 
menggunakan korelasi Spearman dan Kendall's Tau. Ada lima bank yang
memiliki korelasi signifikan antara VaR dan ΔCoVaR, sedangkan empat bank
lain dalam sampel tersebut tidak memiliki korelasi yang signifikan. Namun,
koefisien korelasi di bawah 0, 50, yang mengindikasikan bahwa terdapat
korelasi yang lemah antara VaR dan CoVaR. Kata Kunci: risiko sistemik,
conditional value at risk, value at risk, industri perbankan. Received: April 18,
2017; Revised: June 10, 2017; Approved: June 25, 2017 INTRODUCTION In
main function, the banks collect funds from surplus units and invest to deficit
units in the form of loans and other financial instruments. Casu, et.al (2006)
defined the bank is an intermediary institution that bridges the gap between
lender and borrower to perform the functions of transformation, namely
transformation size, maturity transformation and risk transformation. As a
financial intermediary, the banking industry may be the highest vulnerable to
financial risk. The functions are causes of vulnerability as a result of the
bank's activities. This condition causes the banks face the risk of maturity
mismatch are vulnerable to the threat of a bank run, namely withdrawals
massive panic caused by customer. Besides the risk of maturity mismatch,
other lines of bank business also cause the vulnerability of banks. The main
income of banks is difference between interest loans to creditors with interest
given by banks to customers. But the bank also has other sources of income
in the form of profit foreign exchange trading and securities. From this source
of income, there is a gap that can lead to bank failures, when a decline in
asset values as well as the increased uncertainty in the financial sector that
have a negative effect on the activity of bank's operations. A systemic
financial crisis will have an impact if many banks that have failed. The failure
of one bank can propagate such as infectious diseases, causing more bank
failures. If a bank failure or crisis cannot be dealt with swiftly, then there will
be contagion effects that would trigger a systemic crisis in the economic
system. Systemic risk is defined as the potential instability due to
interference transmitted in some or all of the financial system due to the
interaction of size, business complexity and interconnectedness between
institutions and/or financial markets as well as the tendency of excessive
behavior from the behavior/financial institutions to follow the economic cycle
(Bank of Indonesia, 2014). Systemic risk could be a polemic in Indonesia
when the Financial System Stability Committee poured huge funds to rescue
Bank Century (renamed Bank of Mutiara and later became J-Trust Bank). The
recent financial crisis revealed that micro-prudential regulatory framework is
not enough to prevent contagion across the world as a result of bank failures
that began in the United States and later in Europe and other parts of the
world, including in Indonesia. Micro-prudential regulatory framework is based
10/25/2018 Turnitin
file:///C:/Users/TOSHIBA/Documents/Jurnal%20untuk%20LK/Hasil%20uji%20turnitin/Turnitin_Originality_Report_1025035412.html 3/11
on the provisions of Basel I and II agreements, which impose minimum
capital requirement (Capital Adequacy Ratio/CAR) as a preventive measure
against unexpected losses (Pillar I). Drakos and Kouretas (2014) revealed
that the Basel II agreements led to the development of internal systems for
measuring market risk and regulation as viewed soundness of individual
financial institutions. However, these provisions only based on capital
adequacy ignore factors such as size, level of leverage, and the relationship
with the entire system. Arnold et.al. (2012) found the key aspects of the new
regulatory reforms through the Basel III agreement, including measurement
and regulate systemic risk, as well as designing and implementing macro-
prudential policies in a proper way. Basel III agreement is still in formation is
expected to address most of the problems associated with systemic risk and
developing an appropriate framework for regulation and supervision of
financial markets. For central banks and financial regulators, this is a great
value to be able to measure the risks that could threaten the financial
system, not only at national level but also globally. Given the magnitude of
losses incurred as a result of a systemic crisis, this study measures the level
of systemic risk in the financial system in Indonesia, with a focus on banking
institutions. Assessing the level of systemic risk has gotten a lot of attention
after the US financial crisis in 2007-2008. The main points of the issue of
systemic risk is that the bank is experiencing distress will create panic in the
financial system during periods of distress, causing the failure of other
institutions and lead to the financial crisis. The most common measurement
tool used by financial institutions in measuring the risk is value-at-risk (VaR),
 which was introduced by Jorion (2006). VaR is used to calculate possible
losses of financial institutions within a certain confidence level. The problem
that arises is that VaR does not consider the institution as part of a system
that may be able to experience instability and spreading economic risks.
Furthermore, it is known that the assessment focuses on information bank
balance sheets, including the ratio of non-performing loan (NPL), earnings
and profitability, liquidity and size of capital adequacy is not appropriate to
evaluate the health of the financial system (Huang, et.al, 2009; Benoit, et.al,
2013). Systemic risk contained in any system that is built by the components
interacts with each other. A systemic risk said to be due to such risks arising
from the interaction of the unpredictability of the various components of the
system. Systemic risk is known very widely, not only in the financial sector,
but also in the medical field. Illustrations of these risks such as disease
epidemics, i.e. an infectious disease outbreak quickly over a large area and
caused many casualties. Systemic risk is a peculiarity of the financial system.
Systemic crises can cause great harm in the real sector and the welfare state
as a whole. De-Bandt and Hartmann (2000) define a systemic event in the
narrow sense as an event in which the emergence of "bad news" about the
failures and the collapse of financial institutions, which have an impact on one
or several other financial institutions. Systemic risk is expressed as a
possibility if an institution experiencing distress, this can lead to other
institutions in the banking industry into distress that can lead to bank runs
and banking collapse of the financial system (Adrian and Brunnermeier,
2011). The systemic risk is the risk of joint failure arising from the
relationship between return on assets from the bank's balance sheet
(Acharya, et.al, 2010), The definition of systemic risk from the G-10
Statement on Financial Sector Consolidation in 2001 was the risk of an event
that would trigger a loss of economic value or confidence, and increased
uncertainty of the financial system are serious enough and have a significant
negative effect on the real economy. Systemic risk events may occur
suddenly and unexpectedly. Impact of systemic problems such as the
payment system disorders, impaired credit flows, and declining asset values
will hurt the real economy. Two related assumptions underlying the definition
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of systemic risk. First, economic shocks can become systemic because of
their negative externalities associated with disturbances in the financial
system. Second, systemic events are very likely to cause unwanted effects,
such as a substantial reduction in output and employment, in the absence of
appropriate policy responses. In this definition, the financial disturbance that
does not have a high probability and does not cause significant interruption of
real economic activity is not a systemic risk event. In the G-10 report in 2001
stated after systemic events, the estimated effects are potentially event on
the real economy in general. First, the payment system becomes
compromised, including bank run that could cause the failure of liquidity.
Second, the current disruption of credit can make a reduction in the provision
of funds. This activity is to finance profitable investment opportunities in the
non-financial sector. Third, the collapse of asset prices, may be caused by a
drastic reduction in the money supply aggregates caused by a bank run or a
general decline in the liquidity of financial markets, could lead to financial
failure as well as companies non-financial, and reduce economic activity
through a reduction in wealth and increased uncertainty. There are two an
important element of the definition of systemic risk presented by De-Bandt
and Hartmann (2000), which shocks and propagation mechanisms. A shock
can be idiosyncratic or systematic. In the context of the extreme is
idiosyncratic shocks initially only affects the health of a single financial
institution or just a single asset prices, be systematic in the extreme that
affect the entire economy, affecting all financial institutions at the same time.
Shocks systematic national financial system can be fluctuations in general
business cycle or a sudden increase in inflation. Crash capital markets that
act as shock systematic in the majority of financial institutions normally have
no effect uniformly. The same applies also to the lack of liquidity in financial
markets, which may be associated with a crash or some other event that
causes doubts on the financial health of ordinary traded in the financial
markets (De-Bandt and Hartmann, 2000). The second key element in a
systemic event in the narrow sense is a mechanism that shocks propagate
from one financial institution to another financial institution. This is the
essence of the concept of systemic risk. The spread of shocks in the financial
system that work through physical exposure or effect information (including
the potential loss of trust) cannot be considered simple. From the conceptual
point of view, the transmission of shocks is a natural part of the adjustment
to stabilize the market system to establish a new equilibrium. Regarding the
type of systemic activity caused simultaneously by surprise systematic
mechanisms that lead to default or crashes may often involve the propagation
of macroeconomic includes interactions between real and financial variables.
For example, a cyclical downturn may trigger a wave of corporate failures,
not only increases the non-performing loans in the bank, but also to
encourage banks to reduce lending further (Gorton, 1988). Previous literature
regarding systemic risk measurement using high frequency time-series data,
the use of credit default swaps (CDS). Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) argue
that the CDS is a good estimator to measure systemic risk. The downside of
this approach is that the CDS only captures credit risk and for market risk.
Basically, this approach provides a framework for evaluating the dependence
of financial institutions on a particular system in the event of distress.
Systemic risk studies using cross-sectional designed by Acharya et al. (2010)
aims to introduce a systemic risk size measurements using a technique 
systemic expected shortfall (SES) and the marginal expected shortfall (MES).
MES and SES calculation are based on the daily equity returns. These studies
provide sufficient evidence on the high predictive power in forecasting SES,
which is calculated through the MES and leverage. Acharya et al. (2010)
defines the expected shortfall as a systemic tendency of financial institutions
to be undercapitalized when the system overall capital shortfall. Analysis
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using CoVaR as methodologies for measuring systemic risk introduced by
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) with a study entitled "CoVaR" in which the
author defines the nature and features CoVaR and ΔCoVaR in estimating
systemic risk. This size is based on the concept of value-at-risk (VaR), is
expressed by VaR (α), which is the maximum loss in α% confidence interval.
In addition, the study also estimates the extent of determining factors such
as leverage, size, and maturity mismatch in predicting systemic risk
contribution. Output forecasting results of samples tested proved to be valid.
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) defines systemic risk has two important
components, namely first systemic risk is built-up during the credit boom
when environmentally low risk assumed and can be labeled as 'volatility
paradox' and the second component of systemic risk to the spillover effect 
that intensifies initial adverse shocks in times of crisis. This study outlines
the spillover effects of direct and indirect and is based on the correlation tail
variations between financial institutions and the financial system. The results
achieved by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) shows that the VaR of an
institution and its contribution to systemic risk as measured by ΔCoVaR have
a link that is intangible. Justification separate regulatory action based on the
risk of the institution may not hamper the financial sector from systemic risk.
VaR and ΔCoVaR have a weak relationship. Furthermore, the output of
research Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) show that companies with leverage
and maturity mismatch higher, as well as the larger size gives the highest
contribution to systemic risk, both at the level of 1% and 5%. Adrian and
Brunnermeier (2011) proved to be a technique that adds to the systemic risk
alternative methods designed to estimate the risk contribution system with
individual financial institutions. This approach is the right way is used to
shorten the application of macro-prudential policy. In the model used CoVaR
state variable, which is the macro variables that only serves to make time-
varying VaR and CoVaR. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) build a common 
unconditional ΔCoVaR that is constant over time. ΔCoVaR conditional models 
as a function of the state variables will make constant model into time
series. The state variables used in this study include equity returns are
returns Composite Stock Price Index, historical volatility is the volatility of
Composite Stock Price Index, and real estate returns are returns from stock
price index, housing or property. This study used a sample of 9 largest banks
by assets as assets on the banks controlled 59.48%, or more than half of
total banking assets in Indonesia. Indicator- based approach has been
proposed as a means of indirectly measuring systemic risk using indicators
that are believed to be associated with the systemic risk or systemic
interests. Pais and Stork (2013) showed that large banks tend to have high
levels of value-at-risk (VaR) is a little taller and found that banks with huge
assets have significant systemic risk is higher. Analysis of Huang, et.al (2011)
showed that the marginal contribution of each bank' s systemic risk indicator
is determined largely by the size of the bank. Systemic risk contribution of
each bank to the banking system is defined as a marginal contribution to
systemic risk of the banking system as a whole. Ayomi and Hermanto (2013)
also found that the bank's biggest asset has huge systemic risk contribution.
In other words, the size of the bank will proportionally with the systemic risk
contribution. But Zhou (2010) has a different opinion, stating that the
systemic impact of a bank failure does not correlate with the size. Gravelle
and Li (2013) also concluded the same thing, that the size of a financial
institution not dictates how systemic institutions. In accordance with the
problems posed in the research, the purpose of this study was to estimate
the individual risk of each bank based on an analysis of value-at- risk (VaR),
to estimate the contribution of each bank to the risk of systemic whole in the
banking sector in Indonesia based on the analysis marginal conditional value-
at-risk (ΔCoVaR), and to estimate the correlation between VaR and ΔCoVaR
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each bank. METHOD Data The data used is the financial data on 9 banks are
used as samples, the period of January 2005 to December 2014, as well as
stock market data that is used in the variable state. Source of data used
comes from Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Capital Market Directory (ICMD),
Indonesia Stock Exchange, Bloomberg, and Yahoo! Finance. Measurement
Method Value-at-Risk Value-at-risk (VaR), which is created and developed by
JP Morgan risk metrics have been widely used as a tool for measuring risk in
financial markets. The theory behind the VaR lies in estimating the maximum
value is lost on the asset or liability is given for a specific time period within a
certain confidence level. However, much of the literature is currently
challenging VaR as a tool to measure risk. Wong and Fong (2010) stated VaR
focused on assets in isolation, because of the real risk of the assets
considered less attention, especially when other assets are distress
conditions. In addition, Dowd and Blake (2006) emphasizes that the signal
VaR is only a maximum loss when the tail did not happen, but it did not warn
about the losses that may occur. It shows that only rely on VaR is not the
right method to measure systemic risk. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011)
defines VaR as a quantile θ conditional on assets or can be denoted as
follows: There is three basic methods in calculating the value-at-risk
presented by Dowd and Blake (2006), namely: parametric methods;
nonparametric methods (historical simulation); and Monte Carlo simulation
method. Parametric methods supported by distribution assumptions.
However, the distribution assumption leads to the risk of error specification,
so that selective distribution should be very accurate which is rather difficult
to achieve in the study (Dowd and Blake, 2006). Adrian and Brunnermeier
(2011) defined an institution VaRj (or the financial system) conditional to
some event in the institutioni. This size is based on the concept of value-at-
risk, expressed by , which is the maximum loss in θ% confidence interval.
Then CoVaR corresponded with market returns VaR obtained conditionally on
multiple events observed from institutionsi. defined by all θ quantile of the
conditional probability distributions: So that contribute institution i to
institution j (or the financial system) can be denoted as follows: Adrian and
Brunnermeier (2011) focus on the conditioning events and simplify the
notation , where j = system, that is, when the return of a portfolio of all
financial institutions in its VaR level. In this case, the superscript j is
eliminated, thus shows the difference between the financial system
conditional VaR of financial institutions i experiencing distress and financial
system conditional VaR against the institution i on the condition of the
median. Contemporary size quantifies the spillover effect by measuring how
many institutions that contribute donate overall risk in the financial system.
Spillover effects can be directly transmitted through contractual link between
financial institutions. From the definition CoVaR by Adrian and Brunnermeier
shows that financial institutions are experiencing distress that coincides with
the financial system is also experiencing distress will have a measure of
systemic risk is high. This approach is one of the statistical approaches,
without explicitly referring to structural economic model. After the return of
assets is calculated, from the bank's VaR and VaR system i can be defined. If
is the return of bank i and has distribution F, then given the confidence level
(1-θ), then can be defined as follows: VaR is basically θ of F distribution
quantile returns. Specifically, VaR with a confidence level θ is defined by the
following equation: Means there is a possibility (100 x θ)% return is smaller
than the VaR for a certain period or in other words, with a confidence level
(1-θ), the return will not be smaller than the VaR. After that, it can calculate
the VaR of the banking system as a standard VaR unconditionally, or
conditional VaR in the event that certain banks are under pressure (stress),
i.e. the return of the bank reached its VaR level, which can be called a
conditional VaR (CoVaR). Estimation Method Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011)
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proposed a way that is relatively easy to calculate and interpret statistical
measures of systemic risk in real time. The first point is to determine the
market value of the assets of a bank. Roengpitya and Rungcharoenkitkul
(2011) defines the market value of assets is market capitalization multiplied
by the leverage ratio. Market capitalization is the total number of securities
issued by companies in the market. While the leverage ratio in this case is the
ratio of bank assets to the bank's equity. The market value of assets (A) can
be denoted as follows: where A is the market value of assets, M is the market
capitalization, and L is the leverage ratio (assets to equity). To measure the
return of the assets of a bank i is used the following equation: To measure
the system asset returns denoted as follows: where The state variables used
to estimate the variance of time of VaR and CoVaR where the state variables
can capture moments conditional variance time on asset returns. The state
variables are not interpreted as a risk factor, but as conditioning variables
that shift the conditional mean and conditional volatility on the measurement
of risk (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011). VaR and CoVaR with a subscript t
shows the variance (time- varying) on VaR and CoVaR. So as to estimate and
(in the form of the variance of the time), required state variables . In running
regressions with monthly data, obtained by the following equation: The state
variables in this study include equity returns (EQRt), historical volatility
(VLTt), and real estate returns (PROPt). To estimate VaR and CoVaR there are
several stages of the calculation. First, estimate the conditional quantile
regression analysis of state variables: so that the equation (13) become
equation (15): (15) and equation (14) becomes equation (16): (16) where :
assets return bank i, periodt, quantile θ : assets return system, periodt,
quantile θ : equity return, periodt : historical volatility, periodt : real estate
return, periodt Second, estimate the time-varying VaR and CoVaR using
coefficients , , dan resulting from quantile regression analysis: where, Third,
estimate the contribution individual institutions against systemic risk overall.
The level of contributions is denoted as follows: RESULT AND DISCUSSION
Estimated value-at-risk (VaR) of each bank using the coefficient generated
from quantile regression of 5% and median VaR represents the tail probability
of maximum loss of 5% and median. The estimation results of Value-at-Risk
(VaR) on average during the critical condition (0.05 quantile) during the
observation period showed that Bank I has the highest VaR value, which
amounted to 14.56%, while the lowest VaR at Bank C, amounting 8.32%.
The value of VaR at Bank I amounted to 14.56%. This means that there is a
5% possibility that investors will lose more than 14.56% of the portfolio value
if investors choose Bank I as part of the portfolio. Interpretation from another
point of view is the investor Bank I has a 95% chance that their losses will
not exceed 14.56% of the portfolio. The value of VaR on Bank C of 8.32%.
This means that there is a 5% possibility that investors will lose more than
8.32% of the value of the portfolio if investors choose Bank C as part of the
portfolio. Interpretation from another point of view is the investor Bank C has
a 95% chance that their losses will not exceed 8.32% of the portfolio. Table
1. Value-at-Risk 5% and Median Banks VaR 5% VaR Median Bank A
-0,105811 0,019053 Bank B -0,094110 0,017705 Bank C -0,083150
0,008829 Bank D -0,143496 0,012318 Bank E -0,135702 0,007651 Bank F
-0,125019 0,010321 Bank G -0,107502 0,004644 Bank H -0,126027
0,016324 Bank I -0,145639 -0,005835 CoVaR measured using quantile
regression coefficients obtained from Return on Assets System conditional on
each return bank and economic factors (state variables). Estimation of
Conditional Value-at-Risk (CoVaR) of each bank using the coefficient
generated from quantile regression of 5% and 50% (median) represents
CoVaR at 5% and median.Estimates of conditional value-at-risk (CoVaR) of
each bank using the coefficient generated from quantile regression of 5% and
a median representing CoVaR the tail probability of maximum loss of 5% and
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median. Table 2. Conditional Value-at-Risk 5% and Median Banks CoVaR 5%
CoVaR Median Bank A -0,067474 0,009361 Bank B -0,060764 0,012349 Bank
C -0,051573 0,009991 Bank D -0,070341 0,013295 Bank E -0,053716
0,015109 Bank F -0,062614 0,014264 Bank G -0,054234 0,016360 Bank H
-0,072669 0,013258 Bank I -0,050776 0,013417 The estimation results of
Conditional Value-at-Risk (CoVaR) average at the time of critical conditions
(quantile 0.05) during the observation period showed that Bank H has the
highest CoVaR value, which amounted to 7.27%, while the lowest CoVaR on
Bank I, ie by 5.08%.The value of the conditional VaR system, amounting to
7.27% when Bank H in a state of distress. That is the state of distress in
Bank H will give effect to the system that impact the system will suffer a loss
of 7.27%.The value of the conditional VaR system, amounting to 5.08% when
Bank I in a state of distress. That is the state of distress in Bank I would give
effect to the system that impact the system will suffer a loss of 5.08%. Table
3. Marginal CoVaR (ΔCoVaR) Banks ΔCoVaR Bank A -0,076836 Bank B
-0,073113 Bank C -0,061565 Bank D -0,083636 Bank E -0,068825 Bank F
-0,076878 Bank G -0,070594 Bank H -0,085927 Bank I -0,064194 Marginal
CoVaR (ΔCoVaR) represents the difference CoVaR at the time of distress and
CoVaR condition when the condition of the median. The estimation results of
marginal Conditional Value-at-Risk (ΔCoVaR) average over the study period
showed that Bank H has the highest ΔCoVaR value, which amounted to
8.59%, while the lowest ΔCoVaR at Bank C, amounting to 6.16%.Value
marginal CoVaR (ΔCoVaR) Bank H is 8.59% which means that PNBN
contribute 8.59% of systemic risk in the system when migrating from the
median VaR to the extreme, in this case VaR 5%. The value of the marginal
CoVaR (ΔCoVaR) BBCA amounted to 6.16% which means that Bank C
contribute 6.16% of systemic risk in the system when migrating from the
median VaR to the extreme, in this case VaR 5%. Testing individual
correlation aims to determine whether there is a correlation between the
value-at-risk (VaR) and marginal conditional value-at-risk (ΔCoVaR). Testing
tools using Spearman correlation test and Kendall's Tau. The results of
testing the correlation of each bank can be seen at Table 4. The correlation
coefficient between VaR and ΔCoVaR calculated using Spearman correlation
and correlation Kendall's Tau as has been shown in the research
methodology. From the test results that the resulting correlation VaRand
ΔCoVaR at Bank A, Bank E, Bank F, and Bank G showed no significant results.
While the correlation of test results in Bank B, Bank C, Bank D, Bank H, and 
Bank I show significant results. Table 4. Spearman and Kendall's Tau
Correlation on Individual Bank Banks Spearman Kendall’s Tau Ρ Prob. τ Prob.
Bank A 0,166838 0,0686 0,114566 0,0639 Bank B -0,369922 0,0000
-0,259664 0,0000 Bank C -0,206695 0,0235 -0,145938 0,0182 Bank D
-0,658740 0,0000 -0,489356 0,0000 Bank E -0,001118 0,9903 0,003081
0,9620 Bank F 0,035877 0,6973 0,028011 0,6517 Bank G -0,040142 0,6633
-0,020168 0,7457 Bank H -0,265574 0,0034 -0,181513 0,0033 Bank I
0,479790 0,0000 0,340616 0,0000 The results of the calculations get that at
Bank A, VaR has a positive correlation to ΔCoVaR. The magnitude of the
correlation value against VaR to ΔCoVaR in Bank A can be seen from the
value of ρ (rho) is 0.166838 and the value of τ (tau) is 0.114566. VaR of
Bank E has a negative and positive correlation on ΔCoVaR with the value of ρ
(rho) is -0.001118 and the value of τ (tau) is 0.003081. VaR of Bank F has a
positive correlation on ΔCoVaR with the value of ρ (rho) is 0.035877 and the
value of τ (tau) is 0.028011. And VaR of Bank G has a negative correlation
onΔCoVaR with the value of ρ (rho) is -0.040142 and the value of τ (tau) is
-0.020168. In a scatter plot in Figure 1 shows the uneven distribution
between individual risk (VaR) on the X axis and systemic risk contribution
(ΔCoVaR) on the Y axis for each bank scatter plot shows a very weak
relationship between VaR and ΔCoVaR. It can be concluded that to see the
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systemic risk contribution of each bank cannot rely solely on the size of VaR.
CONCLUSIONS Results of research on systemic risk and ΔCoVaR shows VaR
for each bank portion has a weak correlation and others do not have a
significant correlation or in other words, almost no correlation. The results of
the correlation calculations are under 0.50.At the end of 2008 the polemics in
Indonesia when the Financial Stability Committee poured huge funds to save
Bank Century. At that time the Bank Century was declared by the
government as the bank failed to systemic risk. The complexity of defining
the risk of systemic causes of this case became controversial. The magnitude
of the risk of individual banks does not mean proportional to the bank's
contribution to systemic risk banks. In this study, Bank I has greater
individual risk among other banks, which amounted to 14.56%, while the
contribution of the greatest systemic risk to the banking system is in Bank H,
which amounted to 8.59%. Bank with value-at-risk (VaR) is high does not
automatically become a bank which contribute greatly to the systemic risk in
the banking system. So that needs to be done on the calculation method in
addition to the value-at-risk (VaR) to assess the magnitude of systemic risk,
one of them using a conditional value-at-risk (CoVaR). In estimating the
contribution of banks against systemic risk is not enough to look at the total
assets of the bank. In this study, Bank H is a bank with the largest risk
contribution (8.59%) had total assets eighth largest in Indonesia. In a state
of crisis in the banking system, regulators would not only save the banks with
total assets of large, but also the bank has total assets of small for the size is
not the main reference for the contribution of banks to systemic risk. The
failure of the banks that have small assets would trigger a rush to the bank to
other banks the same level so that it can add to the uncertainty on the
domestic market, which is fatal for the economy. REFERENCES Acharya, V.V.,
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